I am Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy in the University of Campinas (Unicamp), Brazil (since ; tenured in ; Associate since ) . I am professor of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Campinas, Brazil. My main interest is Aristotle’s philosophy, especially his. Lucas Angioni. University of Campinas. Abstract. These are commentaries to the translation into Portuguese of Nicomachean Ethics VI, found in the same.
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My work embraces the following themes on Aristotle: Causality and coextensiveness in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 1. I discuss an important feature of the notion of cause in Posterior Analytics henceforth APo 1. Some scholars have taken the passage as oucas a false principle about explanation or even a fallacy of conversion. I claim that Aristotle is introducing a logical requirement for being the strictly appropriate cause in a scientific demonstration, namely: Some interpretations go in this direction, but do not account for the intricacies of the text and, furthermore, do not explain how Aristotle goes beyond negative causes expressed in the second-figure syllogisms.
My interpretation provides a careful and full discussion of the intricate steps in which Aristotle presents the requirement.
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy. In Posterior Analytics 71b9—12, we find a definition of a higher-level kind of knowledge that can be labelled scientific knowledge. The definition is difficult to decode. The definiens is taken to have only two importantly informative The definiens is taken to have only two importantly informative parts: Not much attention has been paid to this contrast.
Bochum, Germany Journal Name: Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy. I discuss what Aristotle means when he says that scientific demonstration must proceed from necessary principles. I argue that, for Aristotle, scientific demonstration should not be reduced to sound deduction with necessary premises I argue that, for Aristotle, scientific demonstration should not be reduced to sound deduction with necessary premises.
Scientific demonstration ultimately depends on the fully appropriate explanatory factor for a given explanandum.
Lucas Angioni (University of Campinas) – PhilPeople
This explanatory factor angionk what makes the explanandum what it is. Consequently, this factor is also unique. When Aristotle says that demonstration must proceed from necessary principles, he means that each demonstration requires the principle that is the necessary one for the fully appropriate explanation of its explanandum.
Studia Philosophica Estonica Page Numbers: Dec 1, Publication Name: Definition and Essence in Aristotle’s Metaphysics vii 4 lucae. Aristotle begins with a more general account of essence and definitions, which is based on merely logical-epistemic requirements, but at a he introduces a stricter account, which rests on additional criteria concerned with explanatory power of essences and definitions.
The two accounts are far from being incompatible with each other. Ancient Philosophy 34 Lucaa Numbers: Jun 30, Publication Name: Explanation and Definition in Physics I 1 more. I discuss Aristotle’s anomalous terminology “universal” and “particular” in Physics A. Dec Publication Name: In what sense there is no science of corruptible things: Aristotle claims that the object of scientific knowledge cannot be otherwise, and in Posterior Analytics I-8 he adds that there is no scientific knowledge of corruptible objects.
These claims have been traditionally understood in terms of These claims have been traditionally understood in terms of a strict requirement of eternal existence: Sep Publication Name: Explanation and method in Eudemian Ethics I. I discuss the methodological passage in the beginning of Ethica Eudemia I. My central focus is not to discuss My central focus is not anggioni discuss whether Aristotle is prescribing and using what has been called the method of endoxa.
I will focus on how this passage coheres with the remaining parts of the same chapter, which also are advancing methodological remarks. My claim is that the method of Ethica Eudemia I. Aristotle’s main concern is a warning against misuses of explanatory arguments. Knowledge and Opinion about the same thing luca APo A more.
I argue that Aristotle is not interested in any general epistemological picture, for his aim is merely to characterise the difference I argue that Aristotle is not interested in any general epistemological picture, for his aim is merely to characterise the difference between demonstrative knowledge and a specific kind angiobi opinion, namely, opinions with explanatory claims, i.
One prominent feature is explanatory relevance. Dois Pontos Page Numbers: Nov Publication Name: I argue that Topics VI does not contain any serious anfioni about definitions to be used by the scientist and the metaphysician at their most important tasksbut only a collection of pieces of advice for formulating definitions in a I argue that Topics VI does not contain any serious theory about ,ucas to be used by the scientist and the metaphysician at their most important lucaabut only a collection of pieces of advice for formulating definitions in a dialectical context, namely, definitions aiming to capture what the opponent means.
Topics VI is full of inconsistencies that can be explained away by this approach: I also argue as a way to prove my point that the “topoi” need not be pieces angioin a serious theory Aristotle is committed to.
I examine each meander of Aristotle’s effort to identify several uses of key philosophical I examine each meander of Aristotle’s effort to identify several uses of key philosophical terms in his Metaphysics, V.
I discuss the notion of education or educatedness paideia involved in the ‘educated human being’ pepaideumenoswhich Aristotle presents at the beginning of his ‘Parts of Animals’ and a few other passages.
The competence of educated The competence of educated human beings makes them able to evaluate some aspects of the explanations in a given domain without having a determinate knowledge about the specific subject matter in that domain.
I examine how such a competence is possible and how it is related to other critical abilities which Aristotle usually ascribes to the science of being qua being. Anbioni discuss in this paper the six requirements Aristotle advances at Posterior Analytics A-2, 71b, for the premisses of a scientific demonstration.
I argue ,ucas the six requirements give no support for an intepretation in terms of Quite on the contrary, the six requirements can be consistently understood in a very different picture, according to which the most basic feature of a scientific demonstration is to explain xngioni given proposition by its appropriate cause. This paper attempts to clarify the nature and importance of a third kind of sophistic argument that is not always found in the classification of those arguments in the secondary literature.
An argument of the third kind is not only a An argument of the third kind is not only a valid one, but also constituted of true propositions. What makes it a sophistic argument is the fact that it produces a false semblance of scientific explanation: Mar Publication Name: Aristotle rather ascribes to substances a priority in terms of completion, whereas he ascribes to substances-of-something angionni specific sort of causal-explanatory priority.
Besides that, Aristotle argues, against Platonism, that these two sorts of priority completion priority and causal-explanatory priority angioin be kept apart from each other in any successful ontology.
Knowledge kata sumbebekos can occur even when the predicate of a conclusion is convertible with its subject and is proved by a convertible meson, but it is not proved by means of the relevantly appropriate meson.
Journal of Ancient Philosophy Page Numbers: Aug Publication Name: Journal of Ancient Philosophy. Jun Publication Name: This paper discusses some issues concerning the definition of moral virtue in Nicomachean Ethics b a 2. It is reasonable to say that a definition must give a complete enumeration of the relevant features of its definiendum, It is reasonable to say that a definition must give a complete enumeration of the relevant features of its definiendum, but the definition of moral virtue seems to fail in doing this task.
I argue that the definition of moral virtue, once considered in the light of its context, is far from being an incomplete and provisional account: May Publication Name: I claim that the notion of subject Aristotle develops in that argument is quite different from the notion I claim that the notion of subject Aristotle develops in that argument is quite different from the notion of subject he advances in Categories, although these notions are far from being incompatible with each other.
I have two aims in this paper. I claim that there are priority relations according to which some kinds of cause are subordinated to others, even if these relations do not hold in every case. Scientiae Studia Page Numbers: Aristotle seems to present two concepts of matter: Jul Publication Name: I intend to prove that this definition has to be taken as a set of three not only two conditions: I discuss three kinds of relationships between ends and means in Aristotle’s ethical theory, in order to clarify how moral virtues and phronesis are related both in adopting ends and in determining means for virtuous actions.
Lucas Angioni, As quatro causas na filosofia da natureza de Aristóteles – PhilPapers
Phronesis seems to be mainly charged with determining means for an end given by the moral virtues, but it has to involve some conception of ends too. But phronesis cannot be parasitic on moral virtue concerning the conception of ends, for otherwise it will lack intrinsic moral value.
These are commentaries to the translation into Portuguese of Nicomachean Ethics VI, found in the same volume of Dissertatio. Apr Publication Name: Notas sobre Ethica Nicomachea b more. This paper examines what Aristotle could have meant in Nicomachean Ethics bwhen he says that moral virtue is more exact than craft.